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This double issue of the Carrollian, the journal of the Lewis Carroll Society, is entirely 
devoted to Lewis Carroll’s famous short paper published in the journal Mind in 1895 under 
the title ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. In the form of a playful dialogue between 
Achilles and the Tortoise, Carroll offers a regress that suggests that one could never reach the 
conclusion of any argument. This conclusion is paradoxical since in fact we routinely do 
reach such conclusions. Carroll’s regress has become iconic, and philosophical discussions 
around it are livelier than ever. 
 
This collection is edited by two specialists of Carroll’s scientific work, and indeed by a 
perfect pair: the mathematician Francine Abeles who is an expert in Victorian logic and 
mathematics, particularly in Carroll’s logical and mathematical work; and the philosopher 
Amirouche Moktefi, who specializes in the history and philosophy of logic, especially in the 
XIXth Century. As stated in their introduction to the volume, the editors’ aim is to ‘offer a set 
of papers providing key elements to the history and purpose of [Carroll’s] enigmatic piece 
that will contribute to Carrollian studies and, more generally, to philosophy.’ (p. 2) In this, 
they have achieved their goal. The articles in their collection are all original, and often 
insightful, contributions, written by specialists in the history and philosophy of logic 
 
The collection is useful firstly because it contains key resources for anybody interested in 
Carroll’s regress: a reprint of the regress, excerpts of Carroll’s correspondence with the editor 
of Mind, G.F. Stout, in which Carroll clarifies his view as to what the regress is about, and a 
very useful ‘Selective Bibliography’ compiled by Clare Imholtz and Amirouche Moktefi. The 
first part of this bibliography concerns editions and translations of Carroll’s regress; the 
second part, called ‘Studies and Citations’, is a list of mentions or discussions of the regress 
by philosophers. Their decision to list these in chronological rather than alphabetical order is 
excellent, as it gives one a sense of historical context and intellectual lineage. For instance, it 
makes it vivid how little the regress was discussed before the 1940s, and how, since then, 
discussions have grown exponentially. Right now, the regress is extremely topical and so the 
publication of this collection is very welcome and timely. 
 
Below, I offer a brief commentary on each paper of the volume. I omit the very short piece by 
George Englebretsen, ‘What did Carroll Think the Tortoise said to Achilles?’, as it strikes me 
as more of a personal note or autobiographical record of his thoughts on the regress and 
related issues over time than an article about Carroll’s regress.  
 
The first paper is ‘The Making of “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”: Lewis Carroll’s 
Logical Investigations Towards a Workable Theory of Hypotheticals’, written by the editors. 
This article provides extremely rich and useful contextual information about Carroll’s regress, 
for instance concerning Carroll’s references and allusions to Euclid and Zeno. But the most 
fascinating material they present has to do with the nature of hypothetical propositions, which 
was one of Carroll’s key interests at the time he wrote the regress. There are many entries in 
his diaries about this issue in the 1890s, and in 1894, the year before publishing his regress, 
Carroll had written another paper for Mind, entitled ‘A Logical Paradox’ (also known as the 
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Barbershop Paradox). In it, he discusses the nature of hypothetical propositions and whether 
they should be understood as material conditionals. Moktefi and Abeles interestingly and 
successfully highlight how these two papers, however different in their styles and outlooks, 
can be understood as informed by a common interest in hypothetical propositions. As they 
state it (p. 40):  ‘ “A Logical Paradox” and “What Achilles Said to the Tortoise” were the 
results of this ongoing investigation and not accidental contributions. These two papers might 
not capture Carroll’s definitive theory of hypotheticals, but they certainly were important 
steps towards it.’ They make a good case that this is so, even though a clearer articulation of 
how much of the regress turns on a specific view of hypotheticals would have been helpful. 
For instance, in different formulations of his regress, Carroll goes back and forth between 
what look like strict and what look like material conditionals, and it would have been 
interesting to feed this into their discussion.  
 
The second paper is ‘Lessons from Lewis Carroll’s Paradox of Inference’ by Mathieu Marion. 
This examines the widely held ‘moral’ that philosophers have taken from the regress, which 
is that one should not put one’s rules of inference as a premise to an inference according to 
that rule. The aim of the paper is to make links between different authors who seem to have 
upheld versions of this lesson – such as, besides Lewis Carroll, John Cook Wilson, Bertrand 
Russell, Bernard Bolzano and, famously, Gilbert Ryle. The discussion of Bolzano is 
particularly interesting as he seems to have anticipated Carroll’s regress in his 1837 book A 
Theory of Science §199. Marion wishes to draw two conclusions from this discussion. The 
first is that ultimately the regress rests on the mistake of confusing the forms ‘if P, then Q’ 
and ‘P. Therefore: Q’, a mistake which Marion interestingly shows has a long history, going 
back to Greek Logic. The second is that one can infer according to a rule without ‘the need to 
entertain the corresponding logical truth’. This sort of point is mostly derived from Ryle, who 
thinks that it is because Achilles and the Tortoise merely know that the premises follow from 
the conclusion (the logical truth) rather than know how to infer from the premises to the 
conclusion (the logical rule) that they fall into a regress. However, this Rylean interpretation 
of the regress should really be reexamined: for one thing it is not obviously a good 
interpretation; for another recent challenges to Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and 
knowing that might undercut it.  
 
The fourth paper, ‘The Philosophical Significance of Carroll’s Regress’, is by Pascal Engel. 
This essay engages with the way Carroll’s regress is relevant to contemporary debates in the 
philosophy of logic, and in particular its epistemology. It takes Carroll’s regress to be ‘not 
only a mirror for epistemology in general, and perhaps also for moral epistemology’ (p. 105). 
The essay is essentially a survey of the different philosophical discussions, mostly 
epistemological, that he sees as relevant to Carroll’s regress, such as: the nature of assertion; 
externalism and internalism about justification; discussions over foundationalism, 
conventionalism, and coherentism about justification; the connection between understanding 
a logical rule and knowing it; Ryle’s account of knowing a logical rule as knowing how; 
Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations; the normativity of logic; the nature of akrasia; 
epistemic skepticism and the epistemic closure principle. While the essay glosses rather 
quickly over these themes, and one might be left with the impression that Carroll’s regress 
connects with about every debate in the philosophy of logic but at times in a somewhat 
superficial way, it is impressively knowledgeable, philosophically engaging and provides 
much food for thought. It is worth making special mention of Engel’s interesting section 4, 
concerned with the normativity of logic, akrasia and the distinction between theoretical and 
practical normativity; topics that have all become prominent in recent discussions of Carroll’s 
regress.  
 
The last paper is John Woods’ wonderful essay ‘Required by Logic’, which offers an 
informal and lively attempt at making sense of the regress. It offers a close – sometimes line 
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by line – reading which is very helpful in part for his insights and in part for its irreverence. 
Woods for instance does not hesitate to castigate Carroll when bits of the dialogue do not 
make much sense (e.g. pp. 117-8), which might come as a relief to the puzzled reader. He is 
also refreshingly critical of famous commentators such as Ryle, who have become very 
influential in the interpretation of Carroll’s regress: to Ryle’s criticism that Carroll’s 
protagonists are confused between premises and rules of inferences, Woods rightly responds: 
‘since rules of inferences aren’t discussed in “What the Tortoise said to Achilles”, its parties 
can hardly be faulted for assigning to a rule a function it can’t properly perform’ (p. 120). 
This raises the possibility that Ryle may have missed the point of Carroll’s regress, and his 
interpretation of it might be on shakier grounds than the common currency view would have 
it. Towards the end of the paper Woods suggests that the issue in the regress is really one of 
normativity (as is echoed in the title) and it would have been nice to have more of his 
thoughts on this. 
 
Overall the contributions to this collection were very helpful and enjoyable to read and mostly 
excellent pieces of scholarship. There were some repetitions, which is inevitable, but these 
contributions all brought in something different. In particular one gets a very good sense of 
the historical context of the regress and of its early interpretations. This collection was 
probably not the place for it but it would have been nice to have more thorough philosophical 
examination of some of the interpretations offered, of whether they are compelling, and of 
whether they are answerable. Equally what the collection highlights is that there is still much 
room for interpretation and discussion of Carroll’s regress. 
